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	1. At the neeting of the Socialist International in Paris from 11 to 13 April 1953, the consensus of opinion seems to have been that the death of Stalin and the Bursian policy change following it did not in itself constitute a lessening of East-Lest tension. It was generally agreed that some progress had been made in the psychological field, but that so far the Bussian over-had been made in the psychological field, but that so far the Bussian over-tures contained nothing which would justify hopes for a permanent decrease of the tension. The focialists tended to the opinion that such steps as the enchange of prisoners of war, etc., were simply tectical maneuves to hamper the American attempts to marshal the western forces for a contexted effort against Bussia and her satellites.					
25X1		delegates are said to have favored a positive reaction towards Soviet overtures, but other delegates, specifically the Swedes, characterized such an attitude as "letting the wish he the father of the thought." The French were specifically educant in their opinion that a true change of Aussian policy was in the offing and documented their theory with the plan allegedly brought back by Enurice Thorax from Bussia.				
	3.	3. The Asiatic representatives are said to have advised the Europeans to rectlow a strict policy of newer-lity between East and Uest and they claimed that fault Eehru had overwholming support for his theory of neutrality arong the Asian peoples. The British and Scandinavian representatives were the attengest supporters for a policy of neutrality. Erich Chlenhauer, Garmany's representative, endersed a system of collective security with complete Cerran equality. He, in turn, found strong opposition from the French for his thesis. Guy Follet told him quite openly that the French Socialist Party could not possibly expose itself by endorsing German equality a few months before the French command elections.				

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4. Ollenhouer warned against rejecting the Russian offers out of hand but cautioned his colleagues equally against undue optimism. He assumed that the Western powers would not care to reject a Soviet invitation to recure four-power conversations on the Austrian or the German problems. No reiterated, however, that the starting point for any discussions on Germany must be free elections throughout the four zones and the creation of an independent government for the purpose of negotiating a peace treaty. That government, Ollenhouer said, could not and should not be bound by any treaties entered upon by either the Federal Republic or the East Corman Republic. He emphasized that no arrangements should be nade with the Seviet Government which would call for the evacuation of the Western armed forces from the Federal Republic. He added that, in his opinion, the electorate of a unified Germany could be counted upon to ally itself with the West by an overwhelming majority. Therefore any nove by the Soviet Union toward reunification would be an immossurable gain even if the procedure to that end required sacrifices on the part of the West.

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